Legislative Assembly of Ontario

CHILD AND FAMILY SUPPORT STATUTE LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1990 / LOI DE 1990 MODIFIANT LES LOIS RELATIVES AUX OBLIGATIONS ALIMENTAIRES

CONTENTS

Monday 8 April 1991

Child and Family Support Statute Law Amendment Act, 1990, Bill 17 / Loi de 1990 modifiant les lois relatives aux obligations alimentaires, projet de loi 17

Adjournment

STANDING COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Chair: White, Drummond (Durham Centre NDP)

Vice-Chair: Morrow, Mark (Wentworth East NDP)

Carr, Gary (Oakville South PC)

Chiarelli, Robert (Ottawa West L)

Fletcher, Derek (Guelph NDP)

Harnick, Charles (Willowdale PC)

Mathyssen, Irene (Middlesex NDP)

Mills, Gordon (Durham East NDP)

Poirier, Jean (Prescott and Russell L)

Sorbara, Gregory S. (York Centre L)

Wilson, Fred (Frontenac-Addington NDP)

Winninger, David (London South NDP)

Substitutions:

Fawcett, Joan M. (Northumberland L) for Mr Poirier

Murdock, Sharon (Sudbury NDP) for Mr F. Wilson

Wessenger, Paul (Simcoe Centre NDP) for Mr Winninger

Clerk: Freedman, Lisa

Staff:

Revell, Donald, Legislative Counsel

Roux, Denis, Legal Advisor, Legislative Counsel

The committee met at 1540 in room 228.

CHILD AND FAMILY SUPPORT STATUTE LAW AMENDMENT ACT, 1990 / LOI DE 1990 MODIFIANT LES LOIS RELATIVES AUX OBLIGATIONS ALIMENTAIRES

Resuming consideration of Bill 17, An Act to amend the Law related to the Enforcement of Support and Custody Orders.

Reprise de l'étude du projet de loi 17, Loi portant modification des lois relatives à l'exécution d'ordonnances alimentaires et de garde d'enfant.

Section/article 3:

The Chair: I would like to call the meeting to order. We left off in clause-by-clause consideration of Bill 17 at the Progressive Conservative motion on page 32. When we adjourned, I believe you were speaking, Mr Harnick. Go ahead.

Mr Harnick: I was responding, when we adjourned, to Mr Fletcher's remarks where he stated that --

Mr Fletcher: Are we back on?

Mr Harnick: Yes. He stated that promises do not matter, that it is listening to people and moving with caution. I put it to you that by not allowing these amendments you are showing that you are not listening to people. You are ignoring what the witnesses who came before this committee said. I think you also described the amendments as an attempt to fool people and change the concept of the bill. If you are saying that we are trying to fool people because we are trying to prevent people from being forced into a bureaucracy when they are paying otherwise and do not need to be included, I would hardly characterize that as an attempt to fool people.

Mr Fletcher said it was the NDP's turn to legislate and he characterized everyone else as having had his chance. It may well be your turn to legislate, but it is not your turn to force people into a system of universal policy in the area of support obligations.

I would submit to you that the amendments are not directed at changing the intent of the bill. The amendments are directed at cleaning up the number of people who would be involved with the bill but do not have to be involved, so that the system would work better for those who are trying to escape their obligations rather than being clogged with those who are making their payments anyway.

When I put that proposition to Mr Fletcher, he stated, "Well, who will judge?" I put it to him that judges can easily judge the facts of every individual case and Mr Fletcher's concern was, "They make mistakes." Well, if judges make mistakes, courts of appeal can rectify their mistakes. If this bill turns out to be a mistake, it will probably be 10 years until anybody gets around to amending it, and the people who are caught in the system over that 10-year period will be caught without a place to turn and without anyone to appeal to. That is not a concern I would say a court could not deal with.

I am disturbed. Mr Fletcher began his remarks by stating that this was government policy and could not be changed. If in fact that is the case, why do we bother coming to these committee meetings?

Mr Fletcher: I did not say it could not be changed.

Mr Harnick: You certainly inferred it and I do not understand, if it is government policy and it is written in stone, as Mr Fletcher seemed to indicate, why are we wasting our time here if you are not going to listen to us and if you are taking all of this as an attempt to fool someone?

Mr Fletcher had some problems with our amendments. The amendments state that the operation of the bill will be suspended if the payor requests the suspension and agrees to pay to the director the amounts owing under the support order to which it relates and the court is satisfied that the payor is likely to make the payments. In that case, the court would examine the facts and the suspension would then be adjudicated upon.

Mr Fletcher had some concerns about what happens if there is default. When he indicates that is a concern, it is quite clear that he has never read the amendments and I probably would bet that he never has. Subsection 11 indicates that the suspension order "is terminated if the payor, without an explanation that is acceptable to the director, fails to make a payment under the support order when it is due." Clearly that answers the question and the query that he had. Further, the final subsection indicates, "The support deduction order is reinstated when the suspension order is terminated under subsection (11)."

If Mr Fletcher had taken the time to read those amendments, he would be quite aware that this amendment only helps those who are paying anyway. It permits them to get out of the web this bill casts, and it only includes in the bill those people who are clearly breaching the support order, the support enforcement order. So if he would take the time to read the amendment, he can see that the qualms he has about it are all answered, and those are my submissions for now.

The Chair: Any further discussion? All in favour of the Conservative motion on page 32? Opposed? The motion is defeated.

Motion negatived.

The Chair: We will move on to the Liberal motion on page 33. Mrs Fawcett?

Mrs Fawcett: Can we have five minutes until my colleague, Mr Sorbara returns?

The Chair: The clerk suggested we could move on to the government motion on page 34.

Mrs Fawcett: And then go back to that?

The Chair: That is right.

Mrs Fawcett: Thank you very much.

The Chair: Is there unanimous consent to do so, in the absence of Mr Sorbara?

Mr Harnick: No, there is not.

The Chair: We are missing unanimous consent, which means we are on page 33. Mrs Fawcett?

Mr Harnick: Just a second, what was the unanimous consent for, to go to 34?

The Chair: To go to 34.

Mr Harnick: And miss 33?

Mr Wessenger: And then go back to it.

The Chair: To go back to 33 when Mr Sorbara returns.

Mr Harnick: Okay, I am sorry.

The Chair: We now have unanimous consent to go on to 34?

Mr Harnick: Let's see what 34 says.

Mr Wessenger: Are we going to 34, then?

The Chair: Mr Harnick, do we have your consent to move to 34? Okay, thank you.

Mr Wessenger moves that section 3e of the act, as set out in section 3 of the bill, as printed, be struck out and the following substituted:

"3e(1) Subject to section 3i, a court shall not vary the amount to be paid under a support deduction order unless the support to which it relates is varied.

"(2) When a support order is varied to provide for or to vary periodic payments at regular intervals, a support deduction order shall be made to reflect the variation.

"(3) A support deduction order shall not be made in respect of a provisional order that varies a support order."

Mr Wessenger: This amendment provides that a support deduction order can be varied only when the support order is varied; that is, the underlying order.

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Mr Harnick: Can I ask what the purpose of the amendment is.

Mr Wessenger: Previously, under the act, all they had to do was commence an application to vary in order to vary the deduction order. Now it is required that the underlying support order be varied before the deduction order can be varied.

Mr Harnick: Can you tell me why.

Mr Wessenger: Yes, because it was a concern that it would be misused by applicants, by bringing an application to vary and then never proceeding with it. In fact, this was brought to our attention, I believe, by the Canadian Bar Association, as well as a number of lawyers.

Mr Harnick: Can you give me the scenario, though, that you are concerned about.

Mr Wessenger: I understand what has happened in the past is that someone wanted to delay the whole process of enforcing orders for support. They would bring an application to vary and then they would just let it sit for an extended period and not proceed with it.

Mr Harnick: This is vary the support order?

Mr Wessenger: That is right; vary the support order.

Mr Harnick: So they would bring the application?

Mr Wessenger: Yes, and then they might get an interim order to vary and then they would never proceed with it. Normally they would bring an application to suspend enforcement of the enforcement order on the basis that they brought an application to vary and so the order for enforcement would be suspended and then they would not be proceeded with. As a result the recipient would be often prejudiced for several months because it was sort of abused; there was an abuse of the process.

Mr Harnick: I can appreciate your concern, but what you are saying is you have to go right back to the root, which is the support order, and vary it before you can vary the support enforcement order.

Mr Wessenger: Okay, perhaps I will let it be answered here.

Ms Pilcow: That was always the intention and that was what was set out in the original form of Bill 17. The intention originally was that you had to commence your application to vary because we intended that the amount of the support deduction order would always be the same as the amount of the support order in the long term. The problem is that if you get an interim application to vary your support order -- I am sorry, let me see what the exact problem is; the difficulty is that people will believe -- we do not want the payor to have the understanding that this means he or she does not have to pay that fuller amount at some point down the road. So once they get this interim variation, they really have no incentive to then go on and complete their applications.

This way the court has to be persuaded, on an interim basis, that the amount that should be paid is that lower amount. Even if it were left the way it was initially and, on an interim basis, they were allowed to pay the lower amount, in fact the support order is still in that greater amount and the arrears continue to accumulate, but not all payors understand that. This way it is perfectly clear to everybody. The court needs evidence to suggest that amount is not appropriate and that the support order should be whatever amount that new amount is.

Mr Harnick: So there is never going to be a situation where you can, because of whatever the circumstances are, temporarily lower the support deduction order?

Ms Pilcow: You can, but only if the court is persuaded that the support order should be reduced for that period of time, or you can also bring an application to suspend all enforcement, which parties can still do.

Mr Harnick: So essentially everything has to be before the judge at the same time?

Ms Pilcow: That is true. Actually there is one other circumstance in which the amount can be reduced. If you are paying for an ongoing payment as well as for arrears, you can bring an application to reduce the amount of the arrears only. But it can never go below the support order unless the support order is reduced as well. The intention is that people do not go to one court to deal with enforcement and then go and deal with the amount of a support order somewhere else. That is what we are trying to avoid.

Mr Carr: Just on that point, if you go back to get the support order variation, what would happen to the arrears if you go back to the court, for example, and it says yes, and your circumstances have changed and you should be only paying a lower amount for whatever reason? Would they still be accumulating the arrears? How would you get rid of the arrears?

Ms Pilcow: It depends. It is up to the court to decide whether or not it was appropriate not to pay during that intervening period and it varies from case to case. If there was no income during that period, it is not uncommon for those arrears to be forgiven. It depends.

Mr Carr: But the court would do that.

Ms Pilcow: It can do that and it has done that, but it will not always do it.

Mr Carr: What about with some of the changes and amendments we put forward? Would that change any of that?

Ms Pilcow: No, the law relating to variation of support stays exactly the same.

The Chair: Any further discussion? All in favour of the government motion on page 34? Opposed?

Motion agreed to.

The Chair: Back to page 33. Mr Sorbara?

Mr Carr: Try and convince him, Greg.

Mr Sorbara: I am going to do my best.

The Chair: Mr Sorbara moves that section 3 of the bill, as printed, be amended by adding the following section to the act:

"3d(10). Interest on money paid to the director as security under section 3d or on the amount of any overpayment to the director under a support or custody order or a support deduction order shall accumulate in accordance with section 139 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1984, being chapter 11, as if the money were owing under an order from the date the director receives the money."

Mr Sorbara: The motion or the amendment is more or less self-explanatory. It is a simple and straightforward provision saying that if somebody else's money is in the hands of the director, then interest should accrue on it and it should go to the person legally entitled to the money.

I suspect that the government is not going to support this motion and that is too bad, but that is the way it has been going around here. I will be interested to know what the government's position is on the amendment. It is not earth-shattering; it does not change the progress that we are making in this province towards social justice for all and sundry, but it will be yet another indication as to whether or not the government is really interested in changing this bill.

Can I just quote from the Hansard of Thursday, 4 April 1991 in conjunction with this amendment and in conjunction with who has real interest in what is going on here. At that time, on 4 April, a question was asked by the former Treasurer of the province, the member for Brant-Haldimand, which related to unemployment in the province. You would think that the Premier would have been concerned about unemployment. Mr Nixon's question was, I think, rather straightforward and it generally related to the explosion of our welfare rolls and our welfare costs.

In response to the question, the Premier responded as follows. He began by saying: "I just want to make two points in reply to the Leader of the Opposition. The first point is that he may think $334 million in unpaid support payments, and dealing with that problem, is a minor amendment. That is not how it is regarded on this side of the House and I do not think that is how it is regarded by the people who are affected by this."

Remember, the question had to do with unemployment in the province, and what the Premier was referring to was his suggestion earlier on in that question period that somehow our democratic consideration of this bill was holding up some $334 million worth of payments.

The Chair: I have the feeling, Mr Sorbara, that the Premier's comments were not related directly to welfare.

Mr Sorbara: No, they were related to SCOE; they were related to Bill 17.

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The Chair: They should have been more related to the Leader of the Opposition's question, but I am also wondering if you could explain what the Courts of Justice Act is and how this would relate to this particular bill.

Mr Harnick: Do you have a copy of the Courts of Justice Act?

Mr Sorbara: No, I do not.

Mr Harnick: Maybe we could get a copy of the Courts of Justice Act. Is that possible?

Mr Sorbara: I will leave it to my friends who practise law to deliberate on that.

Mr Chairman, you can imagine how offended I was sitting in question period and hearing the Premier of the province of Ontario, who is considered by all and sundry to be a very intelligent man, accusing us of holding up some $334 million worth of support payments.

I do not know if you are a gambling man, Mr Chairman, but I will make a deal with the members of your committee, that if I could have testimony under oath from the parliamentary assistant or from representatives of SCOE that on the passage of this bill some $334 million worth of support payments will then flow, I will defer. You and I know, we have been here long enough to know that this does not change anything, that this does not enhance any additional rights that anyone has. Now, hold on a second --

The Chair: If you could describe the purpose of the amendment before we get into a lengthy discussion of that, I am interested in what the purpose of your amendment is. I am sure the other committee members are.

Mr Sorbara: I will say to my friend --

The Chair: It would be interesting to get to that purpose.

Mr Sorbara: I will say to my friend, the Chairman, that I can get to that and I will get to that in due course.

This amendment is about equity and fairness in justice, and I am talking about equity and fairness in justice. I am talking about how bloody insulting it is for the Premier of a province like Ontario to accuse me and my colleagues of holding up $340 million in support payments. Who is preying on the backs of the poor under those circumstances?

These folks over here in SCOE, if they were given an extra $10 million in resources, could do everything they wanted to do under this act without this bill. This could garnish everyone right away. They could make it their policy under the existing act to put into place a garnishee notice right away. But when Bob Rae accuses me of holding up some $334 million in support payments, you know what it makes me want to do? Give long, irrelevant speeches on the amendment I just moved.

I went to see his press secretary after that and I said: "Laurie, do me a favour, one favour in your four years in government. Get Bob to bring it to the front pages of the papers. Let us have the Premier and I debate this on the front pages of the paper. Tease it out of him. Get him to say it every day. Get the press to ask him a question about what he means, because the press does not know what the hell he is talking about."

I would love that. I would love one opportunity to say; "We are not holding it up. All we want is a small amendment to let the good guys on the system out." But do you know what Howard Hampton says? Charles Harnick will verify this. "No, the principle of universality is sacrosanct here." Another program of universality is sacrosanct. There is no universality here. You get out if you have got enough money to put up a deposit of four months' payment. It is not universality. That is Howard Hampton's view of universality. That is what the interest groups said they wanted.

The Chair: I am still waiting, as I am sure everyone else is, for an explanation as to the purpose of the amendment. I would appreciate hearing that and I am sure other members would too.

Mr Sorbara: Well, okay.

Mr Harnick: It is perfectly clear to me.

Mr Sorbara: I am trying to make a comparison between one reasonable amendment and another reasonable amendment; this is a reasonable amendment. I expect the committee is going to vote it down. We have another reasonable amendment coming up. Murray Elston would like an amendment, speaking of amendments that deal with interest and additional moneys owing, and that is what this amendment is all about. There is the hook, Mr Chairman. He wants an amendment dealing with COLA. Do you know what COLA is? Cost of living adjustment. Murray Elston says that --

The Chair: We are still on Mr Sorbara's motion, which he has not as yet explained, which is on page 33. I would appreciate an explanation of your amendment before we debate it.

Mr Sorbara: I think this is unprecedented. The Chairman keeps interjecting when a member is trying to explain the thrust of an amendment.

Interjection.

Mr Sorbara: Do not blame me. I voted Liberal.

Interjection: You are one of a very few.

Mr Sorbara: No, my dear, I am sorry. I am one of about 32.6% and you are one of about 38%, and if you think that gives you the divine right to do whatever you want, just wait a while.

Anyway, Murray is going to bring an amendment, Gord, dealing with cost of living adjustments. The amendment is an important one because what happens right now with cost of living adjustments, at least according to Murray Elston, is that SCOE refuses to enforce them. As a result of that, they refuse to enforce every support order which has contained therein an automatic COLA clause, that is to say, "This payment shall go up by the cost of living based on the CPI."

Do you know what that means? The payor, as we are now going to call him or her, is automatically in default by virtue of the way in which the people at the branch run the business. So we need another amendment dealing with COLA to require SCOE to enforce the COLA clause. Because after all, if you are denying a spouse who is being supported the 5% or 6% cost of living adjustment, by virtue of the laws of the province of Ontario, that is pretty bad. I will pause and see if the parliamentary assistant wants to speak to that, but I think it is awful that this happens.

Mr Fletcher: Can I ask you a question about that?

Mr Sorbara: A question? Sure. I will defer to a question.

Mr Fletcher: I just want to ask Mr Sorbara on this amendment he has introduced, does the interest money that is being paid, that has accumulated, go back to the payor? Where does the money go?

Mr Sorbara: Sorry?

Mr Fletcher: Where does the interest go?

Mr Sorbara: The interest would go to the person entitled to the money.

Mr Fletcher: Not back to the payor?

Mr Sorbara: It is pretty simple and straightforward. If you are holding $10,000 on behalf of someone and there is some issue as to whom that $10,000 ought to be paid, when the question of the beneficiary of the $10,000 is resolved, that money would go to that person along with the interest.

Mr Fletcher: I was just wondering about the overpayment part. If there was an overpayment, that money would belong to the payor and not the person receiving it.

Mr Sorbara: Yes.

Mr Fletcher: Would that go back to them?

Mr Sorbara: Of course, yes.

Mr Fletcher: But it is not spelled out where it would go.

Mr Sorbara: No. It says "shall accumulate in accordance with section 139 of the Courts of Justice Act," etc.

Mr Fletcher: That is what I am unclear about.

Mr Sorbara: Yes, if you refer to that section, that would straighten it out for you.

Mr Fletcher: Okay; thank you.

Mr Sorbara: I am not going to say much more about interest payments, but I am going to say more about COLA clauses, and I invite members to consider this amendment, number 33, and support it.

The Chair: Which amendment is in regard to the COLA clause, Mr Sorbara?

Mr Sorbara: We have not got it yet, but I think Mr Elston has spoken with legislative counsel or with the clerk or with somebody, I hope.

The Chair: I am sure we would be interested in seeing it when it arrives.

Mr Sorbara: Yes. I think he will be here tomorrow and speak to it again.

The Chair: I believe he will be here substituting for you tomorrow.

Mr Sorbara: I hope so, and he will speak to it.

Mr Mills: I would just like to say that the idea that has come forward about what happens to the money and the interest intrigues me, but I am sure there must be some underlying problem here. In order for me to intelligently address this and either support the amendment or not, I think I would rely on the parliamentary assistant to explain. There must be something that I do not know that I should know before I vote on this.

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Mr Wessenger: Okay. There are two aspects to this, or maybe even to this amendment. It is requesting, first, that interest be paid on moneys paid as security under section 3d -- that is the four months' payment -- and second, that interest be paid on any overpayment to the director, and it specifies a rate of interest: the rate of interest is that under section 139 of the Courts of Justice Act. That rate of interest, of course, is 1% above the bank rate, which would in effect mean that on the security of the fund, to receive interest on the money deposited, they would be receiving interest at less than that. In effect they would be obliged to pay interest on the security in excess of the amount of money earned on the deposit. I do not think we want to have a program that is going to be running at a loss, so I think that rate of interest is clearly the wrong rate of interest.

On the whole question of paying interest on security, the program is in the process of reviewing the question of interest and it will be determined in the regulations what the policy would be with respect to the payment on interest. I think we heard the director last time indicating that there was a provision to pay interest on moneys that were ordered paid by the court. At this stage, we just have not got the details worked out, but they will be in the regulations and I think that is the proper way to deal with it.

On the second question, on the overpayment, the problem here is that when money is paid to the director, the director then pays it out to the individual. We certainly do not want the director paying interest on money that is paid out to the recipient, and there is a provision, where money is paid to a recipient, that a court can order the recipient to pay the money back to the payor. If an order is made, then of course post-judgement interest would apply under the Courts of Justice Act.

I cannot prejudge what a court is going to say, but obviously a court, in determining whether to make an order of repayment, would determine whether the creditor knew that the order terminated and was aware of the situation and was trying to take advantage of it. That would obviously be a factor, so that is the reason why we are opposing this amendment.

Mr Mills: But some areas of concern to Mr Sorbara are going to be addressed in some regulation down the road which --

Mr Wessenger: There is the provision right now in the act that if there is an overpayment, the court can order a repayment, if it deems it appropriate and can order interest repaid.

Ms S. Murdock: "May order," is it?

Mr Wessenger: No, I think if it makes an order for repayment --

Interjection: If it makes an order for repayment, interest flows from --

Mr Wessenger: Yes, if it makes an order for repayment, interest would automatically flow from that.

Mr Mills: I am kind of disappointed that we had the question posed. It makes me think, and in my desire to offer good judgement to the decisions we make here, I ask you all sorts of questions. Mr Sorbara is away chatting and he does not know what comes on and he will come back here and go crackers, saying that we that we do not know what we are talking about. Now that annoys me. He does not listen to anything you have said.

Mr Carr: Greg, you are being slandered here. You had better listen.

Mr Sorbara: Politics goes on.

Mr Mills: It is not politics. I would like you to hear what --

Mr Wessenger: I am sure he knows my answer. I think we could anticipate, Mr Mills. Mr Sorbara is very much --

Mr Mills: I am not slandering him.

The Chair: Any further discussion? All in favour of the Liberal motion, page 33? Opposed?

Motion negatived.

Interjections.

The Chair: He is a member of this committee. He has every right to vote.

Mr Sorbara: Do you want to insult me directly or what?

Interjections.

The Chair: We are now on pages 35 and 36, yellow replacement.

Mr Sorbara: Mr Chair, on a point of order, before the government moves this motion --

Mr Harnick: Are we gold or are we yellow?

The Chair: Yellow. Mr Sorbara.

Interjections.

The Chair: Ask the clerk, do not ask me.

Clerk of the Committee: It was Xeroxed on two different machines. When I asked the people to Xerox it on yellow, some people came out with gold, so it may be on yellow; it may be on gold. It is not on white.

The Chair: Regardless, the words as read will be the same whichever colour your sheet might be. It is a government motion replacement.

Mr Sorbara: I have a point of order. I have not been able to raise it yet, but I will raise it as a point of order. I am suffering from an overabundance of paper. I have a bill here which is not the bill that was introduced. It is called, "Reprinted to show amendments proposed by the Attorney General," and there are notations here which indicate amendments from the bill as presented, or as debated on second reading. Am I correct thus far on my point of order?

The Chair: No.

Mr Sorbara: Let me tell you what my problem is. I have one document here, which is pretty good actually, except it does not have the amendments that --

The Chair: My understanding, Mr Sorbara, is that document, while valuable and --

Mr Sorbara: It has no official status. Okay, let me finish with my point.

The Chair: It has no official status.

Mr Sorbara: What I want to know is whether all of these amendments that are on the white pages, or at least all the government amendments that are on the white pages, are contained in this document.

The Chair: It is not a point of order. The answer is no. Mr Wessenger.

Mr Sorbara: Okay; then on a point of order.

The Chair: Do you have another point of order?

Mr Sorbara: I do have a point of order. Technically, I may not have referred to the standing orders, but we have been given gold or yellow pages; we have a pile of amendments that are numbered; we have an annotated version of Bill 17, and we have this printed thing. We have been away from this matter for quite some while, and if the clerk or legislative counsel wants to put these things in priority and tell me what is contained in what, I can deal with this bill somewhat more expeditiously.

Clerk of the Committee: Okay. We are not using the reprinted copy in the committee. It might be valuable to some people. It does not contain all of the government amendments as the government has given subsequent amendments since the reprinting of the bill.

Mr Sorbara: Does it contain most of these government amendments?

Clerk of the Committee: It does contain most of them. Everything that is on a white page was the original package sent in. The reason all new amendments are on either yellow or gold is so that people will know that they probably have not taken a look at them yet. So any amendment, regardless of the party, that came after the first 54 pages will be on a colour other than white paper. They have been coming in consistent packages every day.

Mr Sorbara: Okay. Mr Chairman, just another point of order: Might I just ask as a courtesy to me that when we are dealing with an amendment from this pile -- white pile, for Hansard's sake -- numerically numbered, you or the clerk or legislative counsel advise me at the beginning of the amendment whether the amendment has been reproduced in this version, which has no legal status.

The Chair: The clerk informs me that if it is on white paper it is probably in that printed copy you have. If it is on yellow or gold then it probably is not. This is still not a point of order. Mr Wessenger.

Mr Sorbara: Okay. Well, just on a point of order then.

The Chair: Another point of order, sir?

Mr Sorbara: I just want to point out to you that this was not the case in the government motion we just considered, and that is my problem. It is not a difficult problem; I am just trying to follow along. The government motion that just passed -- which was that? Page what?

The Chair: Page 34. The clerk says that most of the motions that are on white will be in the printed document, which has, however, no status, so whether it is in the printed document or not is largely --

Mr Sorbara: Well, all I am asking is the courtesy that when the government moves a motion, just to advise me whether that has been reproduced in this document.

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The Chair: The government's motion which is about to be moved, sir, will be recorded in Hansard. You can get a copy of that, and it is on this sheet here. You will be able to identify it as Mr Wessenger moves it if you have the opportunity to --

Mr Sorbara: So you are not prepared to advise me from time to time whether or not the government motion is reproduced in this. The reason I ask is because this is the document that I am studying, okay? This is the document I am working from and where my notations are contained.

Mr Wessenger: I would just like to say to Mr Sorbara that we will try the best we can as we go through. One of the problems, I understand, is that some of the numbering has changed from this printed bill, so it may be a little confusing. We will try to do the best we can.

Mr Sorbara: I think that is reasonable. When you say, "I move that section 3e of the act" or "I move that subsection d(2) of the act be amended," it is much easier if, having done that, you then make a short little statement saying that it is contained in this administrative version on page such-and-such, because if you do not, then it is very hard to follow the amendment and put it into a context, and that is what we are trying to do. Is that reasonable, Gord, or unreasonable?

The Chair: It is a very reasonable point, Mr Sorbara. Mr Wessenger, would you make your motion, please.

Mr Wessenger: Before I make this motion, this is a motion that is contained on the gold or yellow sheets and which is not included --

Mr Carr: Gold or yellow sheets?

Mr Wessenger: -- in the printed bill.

Mr Carr: Which is not white, but gold or yellow.

The Chair: Mr Wessenger moves that sections 3g and 3h of the act, as set out in section 3 of the bill, as printed, be struck out and the following substituted:

"3g(1) Notice of the termination of a support obligation under a support order filed in the director's office or under a support deduction order where the support order has been withdrawn shall be given to the director by the payor or the person entitled to receive support, or both, in accordance with the regulations.

"(2) If the parties to a support order agree, in the manner prescribed by the regulations, or if the support obligation is stated in a support order to terminate on a set calendar date, the director shall cease enforcement of a support obligation that has terminated.

"(3) If the parties to a support order do not agree, the court that made a support order shall, on the motion of a party to the order, decide if a support obligation has terminated.

"(4) A court that finds that a support obligation has terminated may order repayment in whole or in part from a person who received support after the obligation was terminated if the court is of the opinion that the person ought to have notified the director that the support obligation had terminated.

"(5) In determining whether to make an order under subsection (4), the court shall consider the circumstances of each of the parties to the support order.

"(6) The director shall continue to enforce the support obligation in the manner, if any, that appears practical to the director until he or she receives a copy of the court's decision terminating the support obligation.

"(7) Despite the termination of a support obligation, the director shall continue to enforce the support obligation in respect of any arrears which have accrued, in the manner, if any, that appears practical to the director.

"(8) When the director's duty to enforce a support order has ceased, the director shall give written notice to each income source affected by a support deduction order that the support order has terminated.

"(9) A notice under subsection (8) may be given by prepaid ordinary mail to the last address of the income source as shown on the records of the director's office.

"(10) The parties to a motion under this section are those persons who are the parties to a support order.

"(11) The director is not a party to any proceeding to determine the entitlement of any person to support under a support order."

Mr Wessenger: The reason for this redraft is that subsection 3g(6) has been redrafted to delete the reference to a support deduction order which is unnecessary, subsection 3g(7) has been redrafted to clarify that the director shall continue to enforce a support obligation which is terminated in order to collect any arrears which have accrued, and subsections 3g(8) and (9) have been added to deal with the Conservative motion to subsection 3g(6a). That was the motion that suggested that notice be given to income sources, so it was redrafted because we felt that was a good amendment to the bill.

The Chair: Any discussion? All in favour?

Mr Sorbara: No, I have discussion.

The Chair: Oh, you did not raise your hand, sir.

Mr Sorbara: I thought maybe someone else wanted to say something about this bill. I do not know why I have to do all the talking, but if that is the way it has to be, that is the way it has to be.

Can I begin by posing a question, and if the parliamentary assistant to the Attorney General wants to answer, he might interject and interrupt me and I will defer to him, or legislative counsel or the whip or the New Democratic Party members or anyone else. Maybe Charles or Gary want to interject and answer, if they can.

My question is this: Do you recall that about two or three weeks ago, we were discussing the anomaly between a couple of sections I referred to wherein a spouse could, upon serving notice to the court, make an arrangement such that the support order was not filed with the court, and yet would be powerless, except under certain other sections that provide for the placement of a deposit and the agreement of the court, to remove or suspend the effect of the support deduction order?

In other words, to use an example, Mrs Jones, after a court had made a support order, could, filing notice to the court and to the director, arrange that the support order, the fundamental document upon which a support deduction order is based, not be filed with the director, and yet would not be able to do that in respect of a support deduction order so as to bring about a suspension of the support deduction order.

That seemed to me to be completely anomalous because, as I said at that time, if the underlying authority in the support deduction order is not filed with the director, I would question the director's ability to enforce the support deduction order, which appears to me in law to be a subservient document. I think the equivalent in land registration is the dominant tenant and the subservient tenant in easements. It has been years since I looked at property law, but I think as someone who practised real estate law, Mr Wessenger would understand what I mean. In other words, the authority upon which to issue a support deduction order arises only because a support order is made.

If we pass this bill in the state that the government proposes, we propose to say that a spouse -- again, Mrs Jones -- can make a decision to file a notice preventing the director from having authority over the support order, but not being able to do the same thing in a subservient document that arises out of the support order; that is, the support deduction order.

Now, I asked that question and I ask the question again under this amendment, because this amendment deals, strangely enough, with termination of a support obligation and what happens with the support deduction order. Can I just defer for a moment and see whether anyone has an answer to that question.

Mr Wessenger: I think I will turn it over to counsel, but before I do, I do not know whether you are aware, Mr Sorbara, but as a result of some of the comments you have made, there will be an amendment coming, not particularly relating to what you pointed out, but there was a problem that related to this whole question. A minor amendment was --

Interjection: I think it was passed.

Mr Wessenger: Was it passed?

Mr Mills: So you are winning some points.

Ms S. Murdock: See, we are listening.

Mr Sorbara: No you are not, Sharon.

Mr Wessenger: Counsel may wish to reply to that. I think it is clear, though that the intention of the act always was that the support deduction would be something that would apply, notwithstanding that the other provisions of a support order would not apply. Does legislative counsel want to add anything to that?

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Interjection: Legislative counsel is over there.

Mr Wessenger: Not legislative counsel; I mean the Attorney General's counsel.

Ms Pilcow: I am not sure what the question is.

Mr Sorbara: I will repeat it. I will try to simplify it.

What I pointed out the other day was that we have the anomalous situation under this act where a party to an action where there is an application for support can, after a support order has been made, rule by way of notice to the court and to the director to in effect prevent the lodging of the support order with the director. The authority to do that arises under subsection 3(6) of the bill, and again, I am speaking from this administrative reprinted version and I am reading from page 3, subsection (6) there, the English in the left-hand column. The words are as follows:

"The clerk or registrar of the court that makes an order described in subsection (5)" -- that is, a support order; not a support deduction order, a support order -- "shall file it with the director's office promptly after it is signed" -- in other words, when the judge makes a support order, the clerk of the court has to file it with the director; that is the primary obligation; now here is the caveat or exception -- "unless the person entitled to receive support" -- I have called her Mrs Jones for the purposes of my example -- "files with the court and the director's office a written notice signed by the person stating that he or she does not want the order enforced by the director."

So, simple and straightforward, Mrs Jones, after the court makes the support order, can file a notice, give it to the court and give it to the director and say, "I do not want this support order filed." Notwithstanding that, she is without authority to do the same thing in respect of a support deduction order that, under certain circumstances, must be made by the court after it makes the support order. The underlying document is the support order.

Let's argue by way of example. The court says: "It is now time for me to make a support order. I order that Mr Jones pay Mrs Jones $500 per month, adjusted for COLA every month for the next six years." If the court makes that order, this act says that it must after that make a support deduction order which allows for the automatic deduction from the paycheque. Mrs Jones, in my example, can file a notice --

The Chair: Legislative counsel has determined that they have clarified the question that you were asking and --

Mr Sorbara: Mr Chairman, I think it is highly irregular for you to interrupt a member speaking on a topic because you --

The Chair: I am just clarifying the question, sir.

Ms Feldman: This is the same issue that we were discussing some time back. It is quite different from what is on the table with respect to termination of support orders.

With respect to what you have been mentioning, which is your perceived anomaly between the ability to withdraw or not to enforce support orders versus the need to keep support deduction orders in the program, we have previously discussed that the employers indicated how necessary it was, when support deduction was the mechanism of enforcing a support order, to be able to pay through the central agency of SCOE rather than to thousands of creditors across the province and issue separate cheques. It was during the public hearings that they indicated that was necessary, that they had to be able to pay the support deduction order through SCOE or through a central agency.

A second thing that has to be kept in mind --

Mr Sorbara: If I might interrupt, if that is your answer, you have not heard my question.

Ms Feldman: There is more than one answer to your question.

Mr Sorbara: Okay.

Ms Feldman: The second matter is that support deduction is one of several mechanisms to enforce support orders, and the notice not to enforce on the withdrawal is something that has not been effective from the previous legislation. The present SCOE act contains notice not to enforce on the withdrawal.

Now, somebody who has a support deduction order where the support deduction order is working, where she is getting money through support deduction, is not apt to withdraw the support order. But somebody who is not getting money through support deduction because for some reason the support deduction order is inoperable, may want to take her own enforcement steps as she is able to do -- garnishment, default hearings, seizure of assets, whatever she wants -- through her own lawyer; they want to pay their lawyer to do that rather than have state-run enforcement. But that is quite different from what we are entertaining now, which is section 3g, which has to do with termination of support orders.

When a support order is in the program, often we do not know. The program cannot know when a support obligation has terminated because very few support orders have fixed termination dates. Very few support orders say that support terminates when a child reaches 18 or 21. Rather it is when the child perhaps is not in full-time attendance at a school or when the child is no longer, under the definition of the Divorce Act, a child of the marriage.

This has caused problems in the past. What Bill 17 does is it gives a mechanism for the parties to notify the director that a terminating event has occurred under the order, because that is not information that the director has. That is what section 3g deals with and deals with completely, from the beginning of that notice provision to the end, as far as the director's obligation to continue to enforce until a decision has been made by the court, is concerned if the parties themselves cannot agree on whether a terminating event has occurred.

Mr Sorbara: Okay. That is a very interesting argument for something that I did not ask for. I am sorry. With all due respect, I am still at the point where the support order is made. I realize that I have raised this before, but I did not get an answer and I did not hear it from anyone. No one phoned me up and said, "Yes, Greg, we understand your point, but we've decided against doing anything," or, "Yes, you're right and we're going to make an amendment not allowing a spouse to file the notice to the court," or you are going to do something. But consider how I feel. I am just ignored and I do not want to be ignored on this. I want a government response.

Let me put the problem to you again, okay? The parties are before the court. They have separated or there is a divorce proceeding and the court makes a support order. It is the first time that the court has ever adjudicated on this matter. They have made a support order. Under subsection 3(6) a spouse can file a notice to the director saying that he or she does not want that support order registered with the director

Notwithstanding that, if you go through the act, you will find that the judge is still required to both make a support deduction order and file that support deduction order with SCOE, and SCOE is required to act upon it. Now, that seems to me to be bizarre and anomalous and crazy. If I have said to you, as the director: "I don't want this order to be enforced by you. Here is my note saying, `I am not going to lodge this order with you,'" and you say to me: "That's fine. This support order is not going to be lodged with me," but at the same time, "We're still going to deduct the money from your husband's paycheque because we have a support deduction order here and the new law says that this has to be filed," that seems to me to be completely nonsensical. The party has just filed a notice saying you cannot act upon the basic support order and yet you can still act upon a support deduction order.

Let me argue by way of another example. If I am the beneficiary of a support order now and that order for some reason or another is not registered with the director and I phone the director up and say, "I haven't got my money this month," what are you going to say?

Ms Pilcow: File your order.

Mr Sorbara: File your order. You are going to say, "We can't act on the order; it's not filed with us," right?

Ms Pilcow: Right.

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Mr Sorbara: Okay; and if I say to you, "But I don't want my order filed with you," what are you going to say?

Ms Pilcow: No enforcement.

Mr Sorbara: No ability to enforce.

Ms Pilcow: By SCOE.

Mr Sorbara: Yes.

Ms Pilcow: Right.

Mr Sorbara: Yet what you are saying in this act is that even though the spouse has said that, the act still requires that the court make and file a support deduction order and that you act on it. Am I reading this document incorrectly, or is that what you are saying? Because if that is what you are saying, I think that is an affront to the person who wants to file a notice under subsection 3(6). Somebody help me out with this.

Mr Wessenger: I think I can answer it very clearly. It is the intention of the legislation that a recipient cannot opt out of the support deduction aspect.

Mr Sorbara: Even though they can opt out of a support order?

Mr Wessenger: That is right. They cannot opt out of the support deduction. That is the whole intent of the legislation.

Mr Sorbara: I am terribly sorry; I just need a better explanation than that. It cannot possibly be the case. You have to amend subsection 3(6) to prohibit people from filing a notice where a support deduction order has been made. Don, am I way off base here? It just does not make any sense. If the fundamental document is not filed, how can you ask a branch of government to act on a document that is subservient to the fundamental document? I do not understand it. It is like saying, "You don't owe us any taxes, but we're going to come and collect 50% of them anyway."

Mr Revell: From a drafting point of view, there was a motion circulated, and I believe it is called page 10a, which makes it abundantly clear that if this motion is approved a support order to which a support deduction order relates will be enforced whether or not it is filed and whether or not it has been withdrawn. That will be abundantly clear in the legislation, assuming 10a passes. As to whether or not this is good policy, that is an entirely different issue.

The further thing that is left over, though, is in fact that a support deduction order would be filed promptly in any event, and one of the things is that support orders sometimes take longer to make them support deduction orders. So these things are left over. There are always going to be administrative issues.

Mr Sorbara: I hear you on that, and I have just read 3a. It is on one of the gold pages. It ends with the words "despite the fact that the support order to which it relates has not been filed or has been withdrawn from the director's office." But I am talking about the case not only where it has not been filed, but the spouse says: "Here, I'm signing something. Don't file this. Don't file the support order." Yet the law says: "Sure, we accept that, Mrs Jones, but you know what? You are powerless to prevent us from enforcing the support deduction order that the judge just made in respect of your husband's wages."

Somebody help me here, please. I am in distress. I do not understand how you could do this. This is nonsense. Paul, you are a lawyer. Just step out of the shoes of the parliamentary assistant to the Attorney General and tell me if in the real world this makes much sense. Charles, does this make sense? What is going on here? A man can file a notice asking that the support order not be filed with the director. That is to say the director has no power to enforce it; cannot attach assets, cannot execute a sheriff's writ to seize property and sell it, cannot do that, and yet the court, of its own volition and based on this act, is going to start deducting monthly payments from the payor's paycheque. I cannot figure that out. Is it not an insult to the spouse who is supposed to get the support that she or he signs a notice saying, "I don't want the director to have anything to do with the support order," and next month some lunatic director starts deducting money from the guy's paycheque? What is going on here? That is all I want to know. I want to know what is going on here, and this relates to the termination of a support deduction order.

Mr Harnick: Just to go back to what Mr Sorbara was saying, if you go back to the amendment on the white pages of 34, which I did not understand when you explained it to me about half an hour ago and I still do not understand, it appears in subsection 3e(1) -- we have passed this amendment -- that the support deduction order depends upon the support order. If that is so in that section, it clearly has to be so in the other areas, so that the bill, as Mr Sorbara has properly pointed out, is deficient.

Mr Wessenger: I agree with you that the support deduction order does depend upon the support order, but the fact of whether the support order is actually filed or not with a particular enforcement branch does not really affect whether that underlying order is still in effect. It is still a valid court order, the support order, even though it is not filed with the enforcement branch.

I think counsel has indicated one reason why a person might not want the actual order filed with the enforcement branch, on the basis that he or she might feel that he or she was more successful himself or herself in pursuing the matter of seizing assets than the enforcement branch would be. They might have more confidence in their own solicitor than they would in the enforcement branch. On that aspect they can in effect opt out of having the enforcement branch take the other measures to try to collect the arrears. So I can see --

Mr Sorbara: Can I interrupt you just there? Let's assume that is the case. Let's assume that in the example I am talking about, the husband is not working at a job which pays him regular amounts at regular intervals, okay?

Mr Wessenger: Right.

Mr Sorbara: The spouse who is to benefit from the support has filed the notice saying that she does not want that support order filed with the director. The husband is one of the 2% who are the good guys, makes the payments regularly from work that he does or income that he earns that does not come under the definition of periodic payments for the purposes of this act.

You know full well, because you have studied this, that the court nevertheless is going to make a support deduction order; it is going to be in blank; it is going to be filed with the director, and if that person two years down the road happens to change the course of his life and take employment, the money has to start being deducted from that paycheque within 14 days of the first pay period.

What kind of justice is that? No one talks to the husband; no one talks to the wife, who is supposed to be getting the support. That all happens automatically. Money starts flowing in. There is a legal obligation to do it. The director, as soon as he or she finds out that person is working, has to fill in the support deduction order, fill in the blanks and start deducting money. Even though he is sending cheques from somewhere else and they are being paid once a month, that has to be done, and she said, two years before when they were at the court: "Please, I don't want the director involved in this. Here's my notice. I'm filing it."

You are telling me that makes sense? You are telling me that Bob Rae is telling me that I am holding up this bill? I am just trying to get a little bit of good sense. I do not believe, in this case, that you have a bill that deals with universality. Universality does not exist when you can opt out by making four months' payment. I think there are major defects in this bill and we have not seen them all yet, and by God we are going to get to them if we have to argue here until the end of the fifth session of this Parliament, so let's start getting down to work.

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This part here does not make any sense. You can say to me, "Yes, but don't worry, Greg, administratively we are not going to start making those deductions." That is not what we are talking about. We are talking about the rights between people. You are a lawyer, Paul, you have studied this stuff. You know that our job is to make sure that we protect the rights of the individual in a free and democratic society, not just take universality because some lobby group says it is universality and by God the government is going to stand on its universality principle. Get real on this stuff.

Mr Wessenger: The only thing I would say is that we are really debating other sections of the bill.

Mr Sorbara: Yes, we are talking about termination of orders.

Mr Wessenger: That is right. We are not talking about some pissant thing; we are talking about other sections.

Mr Sorbara: I know, but do you not understand my predicament? I raised this two or three weeks ago, spoke about it and put on the record the section that applied and how I thought it was inconsistent. I had a chat with Don Revell and had a chat with your officials. I did not have a chat with Howie. He did not want to speak to me about it. But it was all there and nobody phones, nobody writes, nobody sends postcards. I hear nothing. I do not hear about an amendment. I do not hear that I am out to lunch and my assessment of the bill does not make any sense and I have got it wrong, that it is all okay, that we will handle it administratively; nothing, zero. You have argued in court. At least when you argue in court, the judge is required to give reasons why he rules against you.

All I want are some reasons. All I want to know is how this could possibly make sense, that a support order can be kept out of the hands of the director at the instance of the woman who was supposed to receive support and yet she cannot do the same thing or he cannot do the same thing in respect of the support deduction order which falls out of the support order. Satisfy me on that. Agree to one or two of our amendments and we can all go home.

Mr Carr: My question relates to a particular portion that says, "in the manner prescribed by the regulations." I am one of those individuals who gets a little bit concerned when we talk about the regulations, and I know all bills are not meant to tie up all the details, but what I was going to ask for was a little bit of direction. First of all, how far are we in terms of the regulations? Is this put in there without having any idea? If you do have some directions, maybe you could just give us some indication of what type of regulations you would be looking at.

Mr Wessenger: We are talking about subsection 3g(1).

Mr Carr: It is 3g(2). It says, "If the parties to a support order agree, in the manner prescribed by the regulations." I would like to get some indication of what you have thought of in terms of the regulations and how far down the road we are with that. If we are not down the road, what would the intention be there in terms of the regulations?

Ms Pilcow: I can speak to the intention in 3g(2). It is a very procedural provision and all that it will provide for is that both parties to the support order will be obliged to provide written notice to the program of when they have the knowledge that their support order has terminated. What is going to need to be provided for is how many days they have and what kind of notice is going to be given.

Mr Carr: Why would we not say that?

Ms Pilcow: Because it is a procedural section, and why would we want to put in our bill provisions about how many days and what the notice is going to look like? That more properly belongs in the regulations.

Mr Wessenger: Like rules of court; that is a regulatory thing.

Mr Carr: In terms of what we have, how far are we on the regulations then? Where are you at with that thing?

Ms Pilcow: They are not drafted. We know what is going to go in them more or less. The interest provisions are somewhat more complex and we are not as clear on what is going to go in those as we are on the balance, but the balance of the regulations are fairly straightforward. They are not unlike this one, which is only going to provide for notice by both parties within a certain number of days and who they give it to and when they give it.

Mr Carr: When are we looking to having the regulations tied up? What date are we looking at?

Ms Pilcow: I do not know. I think we are going to have to wait and see when we have our final form of the bill. Once we know what the bill looks like we know what the regs are going to have to look like as well.

Mr Carr: You know how far we have to work and how much time we have got.

Ms Pilcow: That is right.

Mr Carr: Okay. On subsection 3g(7) then, as we go along, in the last sentence there, "in the manner, if any, that appears practical to the director," what circumstances are we looking at with regard to this and then how would you interpret something like that?

Ms Pilcow: That is the standard of contact, the standard of enforcement that is expected and that is prescribed for in the rest of the act. The director is obliged to do whatever is practical under the circumstances and that just repeats the language that appears throughout the bill.

Mr Carr: So again, we are leaving that to interpretation, then.

Ms Pilcow: That is the way the initial act was drafted, and that is the way the bill remains. The director does whatever is practical under the circumstances and is not obliged to do that which is not practical.

Mr Carr: But in terms of legal interpretation, then that could be subject to a debate within the courts? Lawyers will look at that and say: "Ah, now we are going to argue practicality." That is one of the outs the lawyers will use, then.

Ms Pilcow: I am not sure how a lawyer would use that as an out, frankly. I am not sure that it has ever been considered by the court. It has been in there ever since July 1987 and I do not know that it has created any problems. There may be case law, but it was certainly not a problem until now.

Mr Mills: Just to follow up on what Mr Sorbara says -- and I am trying to get it right in my own mind -- he says that they come and sign an order and that is it; they do not want it deducted -- briefly, condensing what you said. It says it does not matter what you say, it is going to go through. How do they go about stopping that, or is that it, when both parties say they do not want that?

Mr Sorbara: You cannot do it. That is my problem.

Mr Wessenger: There is a provision under the act for opting out that is very limited, and it requires the consent of both parties and the posting of the four months' security.

Mr Mills: Oh, I see. So what you are saying is that they want to do it without the four months. That is what your intent is, that they both sign --

Mr Sorbara: Gord, let me put it this way. If you could move an amendment eliminating that four-month security deposit problem and just have consent, then I would say that this thing is available to rich and poor and we could be out of here, and that is all I am asking. I have serious problems with the point I just raised. I will explain it to you again.

The two parties are in front of the judge. The judge says, "I order that Mr Jones pay Mrs Jones the sum of $500 per month." After that, Mrs Jones signs a notice saying that she does not want that order registered with the director of the child and family support office, and that is still a valid notice after we pass this bill. Even though she does that, says, "I do not want this support order filed with the child and family support office," nevertheless, if we pass this act, the judge still has to make out the support deduction order and file it with the director and the director has to immediately start deducting money. That seems to me to be complete lunacy. Mrs Jones has just said, "I do not want this order filed," and yet we, the legislators, say we are still going to deduct the money.

If you want to bring forward an amendment saying that Mrs Jones does not have that right any more to not have the support order filed, okay, we can discuss that. Maybe that is the way it should be and maybe the government should collect all debts and be the funnel for all of it. But you cannot have it both ways. You cannot give Mrs Jones the right to file that notice with the director saying she does not want the support order filed with him, and then at the same time require that the court write and file and act upon the support deduction order. That seems to me to be hypocritical. It seems to me to be bad law. It seems to me that it is going to be challenged in the courts. It seems to me that it is going to create confusion.

In the example I used, if the man is not working at the time that Mrs Jones filed the notice saying that she did not want SCOE to have the support order and then five years later he gets a job, as soon as they find out about it at the child and family support office, they are required immediately to start deducting from his paycheque. They do not have to tell him. They do not have to explain the circumstances to the wife, Mrs Jones. What this bill says is they have to immediately start deducting within 14 days, even though Mrs Jones five years beforehand signed a notice saying, "I do not want you involved in collecting my support."

I do not get it. Even though I do not get it, I acknowledge the realities of 6 September last and I say: "I am the opposition now. I do not get my way around here any more." But I am asking you, Gord, and the members of your committee, to at least do away with the security deposit business. Do away with the four months' security deposit. Listen, bring forward an amendment and you are out of here.

Mr Carr: I just want to add to the points being made and to underline this, to make it very clear that this is what we are doing with this, and I think Mr Sorbara is reinforcing it. I do not want to keep going around with it, but hopefully now you understand what the situation is. Very precisely, this is what we are looking at and this is how it is going to now be. We are going to look very ridiculous on this point, I fear, so that is the only point I wanted to add.

Mr Sorbara: Perhaps you want to go the other way and to create true universality, that is to say, no one can get out of this under any circumstances, no unconscionability clause. I do not care if you put up $1 million in security. Everyone pays to them. If you want to do it, that is universality. Just like banning extra billing, that is part of universality. No better medicine for the rich. Your party and our party agreed on that. We had one hell of a battle with the doctors, but we agreed on it. That is universality. Everyone is included in the universe of the legislation -- universality.

This is not universality. This is the worst bloody hodgepodge I have ever seen in this type of bill. It tells people they can get out, but they cannot get out. It says the government is talking about universality, but if you put up security, you get out of it. Give me a consistent piece of legislation. I would like flexibility. Government is too large right now to take on universality in this area without a bloody good reason to do it. So I say, let's have flexibility and let people out if they agree to get out and they post the security that the court thinks is appropriate. I do not know what that is. Maybe it is a mortgage on the house; maybe it is a good-faith bond, but you cannot have it both ways.

Let's get your response. Let's have consistency. Let's have universality or let's not have universality, but let's not try and have our cake and eat it, too. I just thought my friends over in the New Democratic Party -- maybe I was getting to them because I heard Ms Murdock say, "Well, maybe we should eliminate the security deposit."

By the way, I am perfectly willing and our caucus will agree to an adjournment if they want to caucus and consider the matter and take it to Howie. That would be great. I would enjoy that.

Mr Mills: Mr Chairman, we would like five minutes to look at this in a caucus to discuss this, because in my mind it does seem a bit screwy. I would like us to get together and talk with Paul. Is that possible?

The committee recessed at 1704.

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The Chair: Let's call the committee back to order. We are dealing with the government replacement motion on pages 35 and 36. Further discussion?

Mr Sorbara: Yes. We had an adjournment of, I guess, some seven or eight minutes, and as a matter of courtesy I would ask that the whip or the member for Durham East or the member for Guelph or the member for Middlesex or any of the other members simply report to the committee on their deliberations. I would not mind hearing from the member for Sudbury. She is always eloquent before the committee and I know that she could explain her party's position as eloquently as anyone, so what happened?

Ms S. Murdock: What we broke for was to discuss the security deposit, actually, which is not part of the amendment before us at the present moment. However, my feeling is that we have been told constantly here that we are being inflexible in not considering some of the arguments that the universality question is in question, that in terms of being universal eliminating the four months' security is a consideration, except we have already passed that amendment, as I recall. It would then require having to go again to speak to the Attorney General and then it would still have to be brought with, I would imagine, unanimous consent before this committee to be discussed.

Mr Sorbara: That could be arranged.

Ms S. Murdock: I am sure it could. The thing is that our general feeling is that since we have already done it we probably do not have to do it again. I am perfectly willing to bring it to the AG and discuss it with him -- I will be seeing him later today -- but we did not really decide anything. As I said, it had nothing to do with the amendment before us right at the present time, so we will end up coming back and discussing it, I am sure, at another time.

Mr Sorbara: Perhaps if I might respond to that, Mr Chair.

The Chair: This is not relevant to the motion in front of us. If you wish to discuss that with Ms Murdock in terms of the arrangement you suggested I am sure you could, but why do we not deal with the motion here?

Ms S. Murdock: Okay. Just in relation to that again, I imagine, knowing how it has been going thus far in this committee, that we will no doubt be hearing some other version or wording of the same request so we will probably be discussing it again at a future date.

Mr Sorbara: I would like to speak directly to the motion that is before us, and because it deals with termination of support orders and we did terminate this committee, albeit briefly, to discuss the matters that I raised before that brief adjournment, I want to say in a preliminary way to Ms Murdock that the problems she raised are not problems at all. We can by unanimous consent return to a section. That is the first point but the second point is, remember, we have not yet passed any section of the bill. We have only been dealing with government amendments. Once we have done this we have to go back and pass section 3, because we are always dealing --

Ms S. Murdock: We have passed the amendment.

Mr Sorbara: Yes. Well, we have passed section 1 --

Ms S. Murdock: We have finished all of the amendments we had.

Mr Sorbara: Then we consider the bill as amended --

The Chair: Mr Sorbara, the clerk brings to my attention that we have not passed the first two sections yet.

Mr Sorbara: Yes, that is right, the first two, but the bill is mostly section 3. Sections 1 and 2 are small potatoes in comparison to what is in section 3. Now, I would be delighted, just as we are considering pages 35 and 36, to entertain a motion -- although I cannot do that because I am not the Chairman -- or hear a motion deferring the matter until the government members of the committee have had an opportunity to have a further discussion with the Attorney General.

Mr Mills: That is not this amendment.

Ms S. Murdock: That is not this amendment.

The Chair: No. This issue does not have to do with the support security, does it, Mr Wessenger?

Mr Wessenger: No, it does not.

The Chair: So the issue you are bringing up is a very relevant one for bargaining with Ms Murdock or with the government caucus but it is not relevant to 35 and 36. If you wish to do that kind of bargaining I am sure that the government caucus would be more than willing to listen to you in subcommittee or whenever else.

Mr Sorbara: Mr Chairman, imagine my dilemma in trying to speak to pages 35 and 36, and that is what we were debating before the adjournment, and then on matters that I raised before this committee. The New Democratic Party members asked for an adjournment to consider those matters. That adjournment is over now and they do not phone and they do not write and they do not respond, so imagine my difficulty.

Mr Fletcher: Forget it, Greg; we are not considering that.

Mr Sorbara: I do not mind if you say, "Forget it, Greg; we are not considering that; the bill is going to pass as we propose it." That is okay. Just let me know.

The Chair: Can you return to pages 35 and 36, Mr Sorbara?

Mr Sorbara: Okay. Let's take subsection 3g(1) first of all. Now in just reviewing that subsection you will note that it says, "Notice of the termination of a support obligation under a support order filed in the director's office or under a support deduction order where the support order has been withdrawn shall be given to the director by the payor or the person entitled to receive support, or both, in accordance with the regulations."

Mr Chairman, do you remember that little point I made about a spouse has the right to file a notice saying she does not want a support order filed? It is not dealt with in subsection 3g(1). There are two problems. You see what they have done here. Follow this with me, would you? I know your members want to chit-chat, but you are the Chairman; follow this with me.

"Notice of the termination of a support obligation under a support order filed in the director's office" -- that is the first instance -- "or under a support deduction order where the support order has been withdrawn." Two instances: One where it is filed and one where it is withdrawn.

By the way, it cannot be withdrawn from the director's office unless it has first been filed. But based on the arguments that I was making just before the recess, there is a third situation. That is a situation where a support order has never been filed with the director's office. Why is that not dealt with here? I would rather know the answer to that question right now from the parliamentary assistant to the Attorney General.

Mr Wessenger: Do you think we should check with legislative counsel?

Mr Sorbara: Legislative counsel checked out a long time ago. He had had it with this place, seriously, and I do not blame him. I would not sit and listen to me all this time.

I am bringing up a very serious point, a very serious defect in this section. You, Mr Chairman, said you wanted to go clause by clause. There is a serious defect in this clause and I want to know why it is there. I just established the case without doubt that someone can ask that a support order not be filed with the director, and yet the support deduction order will be filed and will have effect. In this section, two situations are mentioned, where the support order has been filed and where it has been filed and withdrawn, but what about the third situation where there is a support deduction order even though the support order has never been filed?

Mr Wessenger: Yes, I think you have raised a point that needs to be taken under consideration right now.

Mr Sorbara: Okay. Well, let's just adjourn till tomorrow.

The Chair: Mr Sorbara moves adjournment. All in favour of adjourning? All opposed? Mr Wessenger?

Mr Wessenger: I will vote against adjournment then.

The Chair: We are still in session.

Mr Wessenger: I would ask that this matter be stood down.

Mr Sorbara: No unanimous consent.

The Chair: Okay. We do not have unanimous consent to stand down the motion to deal with Mr Sorbara's concern.

Mr Wessenger: I would ask for an adjournment for a few minutes; five minutes.

Mr Sorbara: I am not trying to be unreasonable. If you really want to go on to other sections, that is fine. The substantive problem we are facing right now is that we need your members, Paul, to agree to at least start a discussion with the Attorney General about how we are going to get beyond this impasse. But we have a very specific problem here as well, where the section does not quite make sense. There is a major defect.

The Chair: If there is a defect, then would you not wish it to be stood down so that defect could be dealt with?

Mr Wessenger: May we have an adjournment for five minutes?

Mr Sorbara: I will agree to a recess for five minutes.

The committee recessed at 1724.

1734

The Chair: I would like to resume.

Mr Wessenger: We have a drafting problem in subsection 3g(1) which cannot have a quick fix, so I will leave it in the hands of the committee whether we adjourn or have this stood down and move on to some other sections. We need unanimous consent to move on to other sections.

Ms S. Murdock: I have no objection to standing this down and moving on.

The Chair: Is there unanimous consent?

Mr Sorbara: Could we have a something from the parliamentary assistant as to where he hopes to go with the section that is still on the table.

Mr Wessenger: Okay. Perhaps I should indicate that the difficulty with subsection 3g(1) is that the existing wording does not cover the situation where a support order has not been filed; it only covers a situation where it has been withdrawn.

Ms S. Murdock: As pointed out by Mr Sorbara.

Mr Wessenger: That is right, as also pointed out in his prior problem, which we had addressed with an the amendment that has not yet been passed. So it is an acknowledged technical defect in the wording and counsel really needs more than five minutes to try to work out the appropriate language.

Mr Sorbara: Just let me say the following: I would like not to have to get into another section, because I have got my heart and soul into --

The Chair: Mr Sorbara, in relation to that, the clerk informs that me we were improperly on pages 35 and 36 and should have dealt with the Tory amendment to the amendment first, in any case. So if we were to move to another section, it would be that amendment to the amendment.

Mr Sorbara: Just a second, now.

The Chair: Unless we stand them all down and go to 39.

Mr Fletcher: What would you like to do?

Mr Sorbara: I am a little bit confused. We have just had discussion for some two hours on 35 and 36 and I would like a clarification from the clerk.

Clerk of the Committee: I am quite willing to acknowledge the mistake. Page 37 was an amendment to pages 35 and 36.

Mr Sorbara: Is that 37 white?

Clerk of the Committee: Yes, 37 white is a PC amendment to 35 and 36, so after 35 and 36 were moved we should have dealt with the amendment to the amendment first.

Mr Sorbara: I see.

Clerk of the Committee: So technically we should be dealing with 37 before 35 and 36.

Mr Wessenger: Except that I understand that those provisions were incorporated in our amendment. I assumed that the Conservatives were agreeable to that.

Mr Sorbara: On a point of order, Mr Chairman: May I have a clarification. May I know whether we can move directly to page 37 white, considering that we have had our discussion on 35 and 36 but that it was improperly moved. Shall we go to page 37? We could move that, have a little discussion about it, have a 20-minute bell on it and just get out of here as soon as we can and continue this discussion tomorrow with a corrected version of pages 35 and 36. That is what I am proposing.

The Chair: So you are proposing then to move to 37, have a brief discussion and then a 20-minute bell.

Mr Sorbara: I am proposing that given what the clerk said, that we should have moved page 37 first, we simply move to that with a note, I guess, that 35 and 36 were not properly before us, move to section 37, have that moved, have a brief discussion of it and then either agree to adjourn in about two minutes or someone could call the vote and I will ask for 20 minutes and then we will vote the next day. I am telling you my strategy, okay? Do you want to consult with the clerk first? That is fine.

Mr Wessenger: Could I just ask one question. If we are going to 37, it may be that the Conservatives wish to withdraw it because if they compare their 8 and 9 to our 8 and 9, they are the same.

The Chair: Subsection 6a is different.

Ms Pilcow: It is your 6a, but it is incorporated in subsections 8 and 9.

Ms S. Murdock: In the yellow.

Mr Wessenger: In the yellow.

Mr Sorbara: Okay. Well, why do we not simply move it? We can discuss it and then a vote can be called and we can go home.

Mr Wessenger: They may wish to withdraw it. That is all I am saying. Give them a chance to consider it.

The Chair: Okay. So we are moving, then, to 37. Mr Carr? Mr Harnick?

Mr Harnick: If we can just have your indulgence for a moment.

Mr Sorbara: You get that easier than I do.

Mr Carr: We will withdraw it.

The Chair: The PC motion on page 37 is withdrawn.

Clerk of the Committee: We are still on this unless there is unanimous consent to stand it down.

The Chair: I am sorry. Is there unanimous consent to stand down pages 35 and 36, the government motion?

Mr Sorbara: We could stand it down until tomorrow. Can I just have a sense of --

The Chair: Do we have unanimous consent then? Okay, so 35 and 36 are stood down. We are now moving to page 39.

Clerk of the Committee: Page 39 yellow.

The Chair: Page 39 yellow.

Interjection: Do we have unanimous consent to move on?

The Chair: Yes, we do. Mr Sorbara gave us consent.

Mr Wessenger: Then the meeting would have to adjourn.

Clerk of the Committee: No, no.

Mr Wessenger: Would it not?

Clerk of the Committee: No, we are still on this section.

Mr Wessenger: We are still on this section?

The Chair: Mr Sorbara was the one who was withholding unanimous consent, and he gave it a few moments ago.

Clerk of the Committee: Is there unanimous consent to stand down --

The Chair: It is somewhat confusing. I personally experienced that.

Ms S. Murdock: Your yellow and/or gold.

The Chair: Your yellow and/or gold 39 replacement.

Mr Sorbara: Mr Chairman, just before we move that, given that we have sort of blown this now and we have blown 35 and 36 out of the water and it is going to have to come back in neither a yellow nor a gold nor a white but something else as soon as the government redrafts it, why do we not just adjourn until tomorrow?

I will move adjournment and ask for a 20-minute bell.

Mr Fletcher: On a point of clarification, Mr Chair: Is this a 20-minute bell on the adjournment? Can we have some direction from the clerk?

Clerk of the Committee: Mr Sorbara moved adjournment. Therefore, there is a motion on the floor and any member can ask for 20 minutes to bring in his members on any vote. There is a vote on the floor and the vote is to move adjournment. Therefore, because it is 18 minutes to 6, this committee cannot come back before 6 o'clock and therefore we will technically stand adjourned until tomorrow after routine proceedings.

Mr Fletcher: Does that mean that we come back and we vote on a motion to adjourn at the next meeting?

Clerk of the Committee: No.

Mr Wessenger: No, we have had unanimous consent to adjourn now.

Mr Fletcher: I did not hear that.

Interjection: We do not want to come back and vote on an adjournment.

The Chair: So when we resume, Mr Wessenger --

Mr Wessenger: We hope to return to pages 35 and 36.

The committee adjourned at 1743.